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chore: claude code permissions should not be checked in #2269
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Looks good to me! 👍
Reviewed everything up to e6cc466 in 41 seconds. Click for details.
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1. .claude/settings.local.json:4
- Draft comment:
Empty 'allow' array: Ensure that disabling all commands is intentional and won’t break expected behavior. Consider adding an inline comment explaining the rationale. - Reason this comment was not posted:
Comment did not seem useful. Confidence is useful =50%
<= threshold50%
The comment is asking the author to ensure that disabling all commands is intentional, which is not allowed. However, it also suggests adding an inline comment explaining the rationale, which is a specific suggestion to improve code clarity. The first part of the comment is not allowed, but the second part is useful.
2. .claude/settings.local.json:7
- Draft comment:
Missing trailing newline at end of file. Please add one to follow best practices. - Reason this comment was not posted:
Confidence changes required:33%
<= threshold50%
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Workflow ID: wflow_UnRMeIxDqGv9KJwY
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Thanks for this! We've definitely been a little aggressive with our own Claude Code adoption and I totally hear you on the security risks here. Sorry this lounged for so long, but I'll merge this now :) |
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. 📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know! |
The permissions file allows all `bash` commands (`Bash(*)`), but even if it didn't it still allows many dangerous commands (`Bash(rm:*)`, `Bash(node:*)`). While I don't think this in and of itself is really all that exploitable, I do think it increases the exposure risk of community members. People who want to contribute to the repository may become at risk to something like a compromised MCP server or a model going a bit wild, even if they would normally manually approve commands. My personal take is that a public repository should not prescribe permissions for something as powerful as Claude Code. [Anthropic's documentation](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code/settings#settings-files) suggest adding `.claude/settings.local.json` to the `.gitignore`, as well. <!-- ELLIPSIS_HIDDEN --> ---- > [!IMPORTANT] > Remove all allowed Bash commands from `.claude/settings.local.json` to reduce exposure risk. > > - **Permissions**: > - Remove all allowed Bash commands from `permissions` in `.claude/settings.local.json`, leaving `allow` list empty. > - No changes to `deny` list. > > <sup>This description was created by </sup>[<img alt="Ellipsis" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Ellipsis-blue?color=175173">](https://www.ellipsis.dev?ref=BoundaryML%2Fbaml&utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral)<sup> for e6cc466. You can [customize](https://app.ellipsis.dev/BoundaryML/settings/summaries) this summary. It will automatically update as commits are pushed.</sup> <!-- ELLIPSIS_HIDDEN --> --------- Co-authored-by: Sam Lijin <sam@boundaryml.com>
The permissions file allows all
bash
commands (Bash(*)
), but even if it didn't it still allows many dangerous commands (Bash(rm:*)
,Bash(node:*)
).While I don't think this in and of itself is really all that exploitable, I do think it increases the exposure risk of community members.
People who want to contribute to the repository may become at risk to something like a compromised MCP server or a model going a bit wild, even if they would normally manually approve commands.
My personal take is that a public repository should not prescribe permissions for something as powerful as Claude Code.
Anthropic's documentation suggest adding
.claude/settings.local.json
to the.gitignore
, as well.Important
Remove all allowed Bash commands from
.claude/settings.local.json
to reduce exposure risk.permissions
in.claude/settings.local.json
, leavingallow
list empty.deny
list.This description was created by
for e6cc466. You can customize this summary. It will automatically update as commits are pushed.