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@ActuallyTrent ActuallyTrent commented Aug 7, 2025

The permissions file allows all bash commands (Bash(*)), but even if it didn't it still allows many dangerous commands (Bash(rm:*), Bash(node:*)).

While I don't think this in and of itself is really all that exploitable, I do think it increases the exposure risk of community members.

People who want to contribute to the repository may become at risk to something like a compromised MCP server or a model going a bit wild, even if they would normally manually approve commands.

My personal take is that a public repository should not prescribe permissions for something as powerful as Claude Code.

Anthropic's documentation suggest adding .claude/settings.local.json to the .gitignore, as well.


Important

Remove all allowed Bash commands from .claude/settings.local.json to reduce exposure risk.

  • Permissions:
    • Remove all allowed Bash commands from permissions in .claude/settings.local.json, leaving allow list empty.
    • No changes to deny list.

This description was created by Ellipsis for e6cc466. You can customize this summary. It will automatically update as commits are pushed.

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Important

Looks good to me! 👍

Reviewed everything up to e6cc466 in 41 seconds. Click for details.
  • Reviewed 57 lines of code in 1 files
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1. .claude/settings.local.json:4
  • Draft comment:
    Empty 'allow' array: Ensure that disabling all commands is intentional and won’t break expected behavior. Consider adding an inline comment explaining the rationale.
  • Reason this comment was not posted:
    Comment did not seem useful. Confidence is useful = 50% <= threshold 50% The comment is asking the author to ensure that disabling all commands is intentional, which is not allowed. However, it also suggests adding an inline comment explaining the rationale, which is a specific suggestion to improve code clarity. The first part of the comment is not allowed, but the second part is useful.
2. .claude/settings.local.json:7
  • Draft comment:
    Missing trailing newline at end of file. Please add one to follow best practices.
  • Reason this comment was not posted:
    Confidence changes required: 33% <= threshold 50% None

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@sxlijin sxlijin changed the title Remove Claude Code Permissions chore: claude code permissions should not be checked in Aug 27, 2025
@sxlijin sxlijin had a problem deploying to boundary-tools-dev August 27, 2025 02:26 — with GitHub Actions Failure
@sxlijin sxlijin had a problem deploying to boundary-tools-dev August 27, 2025 02:26 — with GitHub Actions Failure
@sxlijin sxlijin had a problem deploying to boundary-tools-dev August 27, 2025 02:26 — with GitHub Actions Failure
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sxlijin commented Aug 27, 2025

Thanks for this! We've definitely been a little aggressive with our own Claude Code adoption and I totally hear you on the security risks here. Sorry this lounged for so long, but I'll merge this now :)

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codecov bot commented Aug 27, 2025

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.

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@sxlijin sxlijin added this pull request to the merge queue Aug 27, 2025
Merged via the queue into BoundaryML:canary with commit 99204c8 Aug 27, 2025
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cg-jl pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 28, 2025
The permissions file allows all `bash` commands (`Bash(*)`), but even if
it didn't it still allows many dangerous commands (`Bash(rm:*)`,
`Bash(node:*)`).

While I don't think this in and of itself is really all that
exploitable, I do think it increases the exposure risk of community
members.

People who want to contribute to the repository may become at risk to
something like a compromised MCP server or a model going a bit wild,
even if they would normally manually approve commands.

My personal take is that a public repository should not prescribe
permissions for something as powerful as Claude Code.

[Anthropic's
documentation](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code/settings#settings-files)
suggest adding `.claude/settings.local.json` to the `.gitignore`, as
well.

<!-- ELLIPSIS_HIDDEN -->

----

> [!IMPORTANT]
> Remove all allowed Bash commands from `.claude/settings.local.json` to
reduce exposure risk.
> 
>   - **Permissions**:
> - Remove all allowed Bash commands from `permissions` in
`.claude/settings.local.json`, leaving `allow` list empty.
>     - No changes to `deny` list.
> 
> <sup>This description was created by </sup>[<img alt="Ellipsis"
src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Ellipsis-blue?color=175173">](https://www.ellipsis.dev?ref=BoundaryML%2Fbaml&utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral)<sup>
for e6cc466. You can
[customize](https://app.ellipsis.dev/BoundaryML/settings/summaries) this
summary. It will automatically update as commits are pushed.</sup>

<!-- ELLIPSIS_HIDDEN -->

---------

Co-authored-by: Sam Lijin <sam@boundaryml.com>
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2 participants